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 UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE SCHOOL OF LAW 
 
Charles Tiefer                                                                                      
Professor of Law                                                                      Hearing on September 14, 2016 
 
                                                                                                         
TESTIMONY BEFORE 
THE HOUSE COMMITTEE  
ON SCIENCE, SPACE AND TECHNOLOGY 
  
 by Professor Charles Tiefer 
 
Re: The Committee Cannot and Should Not 
 Try to Enforce Subpoenas Against  
State Attorneys General  
Investigating Exxon’s Climate Risk Fraud 
 
Outline of Tiefer Testimony 
No House Committee has ever tried, nor should try, to enforce subpoenas against state 
Attorneys General. 
I can say none has ever tried -- based on extensive first-hand-experience, the 
literature on investigations, and all the research for this hearing. 
If committees felt AG subpoenas were legitimate, in two centuries they would 
have tried. 
The federalism barrier is like the “executive-commandeering” principle. 
There could never be enforcement by the Justice Department or by courts. 
 
The Science Committee has no authority to enforce subpoenas against state AGs. 
The “constitutional rights” explanation is without merit for fraud. 
Committees must have clear authority.  Tobin v. United States. 
The Science Committee authority is over federal scientific “Government 
activities,” not state AGs. 
Environmental groups are protected from harassment via broad subpoena. 
 
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today.  I served in the House General 
Counsel’s office in 1984-1995, becoming General Counsel (Acting).  (Since 1995, I have 
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been Professor at the University of Baltimore School of Law,)   So, I have lengthy full-
time experience, including extensive work on Congressional subpoenas.  My work takes 
in whether the House, or this Committee, may justifiably try to enforce subpoenas against 
state Attorneys General (the answer being: no).  I have had more years of experience than 
almost anyone else in House history focused on this area.  While the other professors on 
this panel have done various things, none has been the House General Counsel.  I stood 
behind the dais of committees many, many times, which few did, advising Chairmen on 
the legitimate lawful use of Congressional oversight authority.  
  
In 1987 I was Special Deputy Chief Counsel of the House Iran-Contra Committee 
and worked intensively on the most advanced of all House investigative issues.  Since 
becoming Professor I have written extensively on investigative and related issues.  
Charles Tiefer, “The Specially Investigated President,” 5 Univ. of Chicago Roundtable 
143-204 (1998); see also Charles Tiefer, The Polarized Congress: The Post-Traditional 
Procedure of Its Current Struggles (University Press of America, 2016).   
 
I might note that I have kept my hand in, in a bipartisan way, hearings involving 
matters like those here.  Chairman Sensenbrenner (R-Wis.) called me as lead witness at 
his hearing on the FBI raid on a Member’s office.1  I was Chairman Issa’s (R-Cal.) lead 
witness at his hearing on the demand for Justice Department materials that became the 
House’s contempt case against Attorney General Holder.2   
 
 Let me say again in the plainest terms: when committees under a Republican 
majority sought materials to which they were entitled, I was vigorously on their side, and 
Chairman Issa and Sensenbrenner were glad to rely on me; when you seek material from 
State Attorneys General on their investigation of climate risk fraud, however, your 
position is without constitutional and legal merit. It is simply bogus.    
 
 
I.No House Committee Has Ever Tried, Nor Should Try, To Enforce Subpoenas Against 
State AGs 
 
I-A No House Committee Has Ever Tried; Look at the Majority’s Testimony – 
Its Empty Abstractions Fail to Identify Even a Single House Subpoena 
Enforcement, in 200 Years, to a State AG 
 
                                                 
1 “The Search Warrant Raid Was an Unnecessary and Radical Step,” in Reckless 
Justice: Did the Saturday Night Raid of Congress Trample the Constitution?, 
Hearing Before the House Committee on the Judiciary (May 30, 2006). 
 
2 “Congressional Committee Conducting Oversight of ATF Program to Sell 
Weapons to Smugglers, Notwithstanding Pending Cases,” in Hearing on Justice 
Department Response to Congressional Subpoenas: Hearing Before the House 
Committee on Government Oversight (June 13, 2011). 
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No House Committee has ever tried to enforce subpoenas against state Attorneys 
General.  I challenge, bluntly, the majority witnesses to do what their written testimony 
does not do – provide written citations  for any House committee, in over two hundred 
years of House investigations, to have ever tried to enforce a subpoena against state 
Attorneys General.3 
 
Why can I say there have been no such subpoenas enforced against State AGs?  
First, from extensive first-hand experience.  For my eleven years in the House Counsel’s 
office, every House committee subpoena was examined by me.  At the time I left that 
office, I had personally examined more than half of all the House committee subpoenas 
in all of history (this being more than half because the pace had picked up markedly 
during my years, including the high-powered House Iran-contra Committee, for which I 
personally drafted most of the subpoenas with document demands).  And, I saw the 
research files for subpoenas before my time of service.  I saw who those hundreds of 
subpoenas were directed at. The upshot: House committees did not enforce subpoenas to 
state Attorneys General. 
 
Second, both to start my role in the Senate and House Counsel offices, and to stay 
in touch afterwards, I have read a great deal of the literature about investigations.  To 
illustrate from the related sphere of House procedure, I authored a treatise with 1000 
pages and 2000 footnotes; this year I have published a new book on the same House 
subject, with almost 200 pages.   I had the benefit of hundreds of pages from the 
Congressional Research Service, as well as law review articles and the like.  I was, of 
course, particularly interested in more striking or controversial instances, of which 
something about state Attorneys General would have been front and center.  I studied 
deeply about every kind of special subpoenas from tax records to immunized witnesses.  
No enforcement of House committee subpoenas to state Attorneys General could be 
found.4 
 
Third, in connection with this investigation, vast research forces have been 
mobilized from all direction.  The Congressional Research Service looked again.  So did 
majority witnesses.  So, presumably, did majority staff.  With all that research firepower, 
no enforcement of House committee subpoenas to state Attorneys General could be 
found. 
 
 Why does it matter that there have been no established examples?  After all, new 
things do happen.  But, consider the subject.  New subjects may arise for which 
established examples would not exist.  For example, an FBI raid on a House Member’s 
office raised the relatively novel question, not long ago, of how to investigate Member 
                                                 
3 I am not referring to the distinguishable Tobin case, discussed below, in which enforcement lost in a 
subpoena to a interstate compact authority, not to a state AG. 
4 Quite the opposite, in House Practice: A Guide to the Rules, Precedents and Procedures of the House 
(GPO 2011) I found: “The investigative power cannot be used to expose merely for the sake of exposure or 
to inquire into matters which are within the exclusive province of one of the other branches of government 
or which are reserved to the States.”  (Underlining added) 
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computer hard drives.  On that novel subject of hard drives, the lack of historic examples 
is not surprising.  Hard drives were unheard of awhile back. 
 
 But, for two centuries, there have been House committees, and, state Attorneys 
General.  The explanation for the absence of precedent is hardly one of novelty.  It was 
always a possibility, for House committees to attempt something.  Suppose we assume 
that at least a quarter (25%) of the time, the chair of a House Committee is in the 
opposition party to some prominent state Attorneys General, just like this chair is for the 
subpoena recipients.  Figure at least a half-dozen House Committees each Congress, and 
just one century of history (that is, 50 Congresses) to keep the numbers low, and 25% 
party opposition, and there are obviously many dozens of times, if not hundreds, when 
the incentive would have been there for House committees to subpoena state Attorneys 
General – that is if they considered it legitimate to try to enforce committee subpoenas 
against state AGs.  Against this background, the fact that not one single solitary example 
of it, shows there is an overwhelming historical consensus against what Chairman Smith 
is trying to do. 
 
 I-B. No House Committee Should Try To Enforce Subpoenas Against State AGs 
 
 
Looking particularly at these subpoenas, they concern state Attorney General law 
enforcement investigations of climate risk fraud.  These go against the combination of 
mutually reinforcing aspects of resistance, namely, federalism and law enforcement.   
 
It is not merely that in this matter, a House Committee is going into an area that is 
largely left to the states, like crime on school premises.  Rather, a House Committee is 
going squarely against a key component of state sovereignty itself, namely, state 
Attorneys General.  Could Congress abolish state Attorneys General?  Could Congress 
put state Attorneys General under the command of the nearest U.S. Attorneys?  Could 
Congress require state Attorneys General to investigate what does not interest them, but 
does interest the majority party of the House?  Even to suggest these things is to see the 
strong barrier of state sovereignty.   
 
An example of the cases supporting the federalism barrier is the “anti-
commandeering” principle. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. 
United Sates, 404 U.S. 144 (1992); compare Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000).  This 
line of cases looks back at history and particularly at the earliest Congresses.  The issue 
in Printz was whether Congress could oblige state officials to do background checks on 
handgun buyers.  The Supreme Court said “no.”  Such “executive-commandeering 
statutes” did not appear until “very recent years.”  521 U.S. at 916.  
 
This applies with maximum force to enforcement of committee subpoenas against 
Attorneys General.  The ban on committee subpoena enforcement against state AGs has 
the same powerful length of history and comparable protections of federalism.  This 
position is expressed with great force and eloquence in the submissions by the state 
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Attorney Generals themselves to this committee.  I will not attempt to repeat what they 
have said.  I simply direct the Committee’s attention to the state AGs’ submissions. 
 
 Suppose a House Committee blundered ahead blindly, and attempted quixotically 
to enforce subpoenas against state Attorneys General.  Suppose even the House backed 
the Committee and voted for enforcement, presumably along party lines, further 
underlining that the issue is merely political.  The answer is that there could never be 
enforcement, only further demonstrations of the illegitimate nature of the effort. 
 
 Consider, first, that the only enforcement route is contempt of Congress under 2 
USC 192.  There is no civil enforcement statute for the House (in contrast to the Senate).  
And, this enforcement discussed in today’s hearing does not involve federal executive 
officials invoking federal executive privilege, the special, unique justification expressed 
for the couple of recent trial judge House contempt decisions. 2 USC 192 is the live route 
for House contempt.  I personally directed, at the staff level, one of the last successful 2 
USC 192 efforts by the House, forcing Ferdinand Marcos’s recalcitrant law firm to 
surrender the secrets of his hidden wealth, only after a (bipartisan) House vote of 
contempt.  There have been many scores of House contempt votes under 2 USC 192, 
particularly during the red-baiting period in the 1950s and 1960s. 
 
 Second, however, it would take a decision of the Justice Department to go ahead 
with a 2 USC 192 case against a state Attorney General.  Based on my own experience, 
and all I have learned from a multitude of sources about contempt, that is simply a non-
starter.  The Federal Justice Department sees state Attorneys General as their colleagues 
and partners in law enforcement.  There is no aspect of this case to differentiate it as 
involving some personal wrongdoing of a corrupt nature.   The Justice Department does 
not go into court seeking orders intruding into the work of the other sovereign law 
enforcement officers – not even injunctive orders.  A contempt case under 2 USC 192 
carries a sentence of a year in jail.  No federal Justice Department is going to seek to 
declare as a criminal, and to imprison, a state Attorney General for a year just on the 
notion this vindicates the right of a House committee to enforce subpoenas.   
 
 Third, even making the far-out assumption that the federal Justice Department did 
indict a state AG to enforce a House committee subpoena, no federal judge could ever be 
expected to uphold such an indictment and send the state AG to prison.  Federal judges 
see state AGs as chosen leaders of a parallel sovereign (noting again that this is not about 
personal wrongdoing of a corrupt nature).  They rule sometimes on state AG cases, but 
they do not render criminal judgments against state AGs themselves.  Much less would 
judges do so, not for some broad crusade by the federal Executive Branch on behalf of 
some helpless minority being grievously oppressed under a state, but rather in vindication 
of a House committee venturing without support to go where no committee before it  has 
ever gone. 
 
 
II.  The Science Committee Has No Authority to Enforce Subpoenas Against State AGs 
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II-A    The Supposed “Constitutional Rights” Explanation by the Majority is 
           Without Merit. 
 
 The gravamen of the state AG investigations is: Exxon Mobil made statements to 
investors about (absence of established) climate risks; these Exxon statements to 
investors conflicted factually with the company’s own extensive record of research, about 
the real peril of climate change.  In a word, Exxon committed fraud about climate change 
risk.   Obviously, since Exxon dominates the carbon fuel business, a conflict between 
what it misrepresents to investors, vs. what it actually digs into itself about that, is 
material.   
 
The issue is similar to the tobacco companies being untruthful.  Their statements 
about nicotine not being addictive, conflicted with their own research.  State Attorneys 
General sued successfully to hold them accountable.   
 
Now, it appears, the House Science Committee deems this state AG investigation 
to violate Exxon’s First Amendment rights.  So the Science Committee deems itself to be 
riding to the First Amendment rescue of Exxon, and push back against the state AGs even 
trying to look into fraud. 
 
 However, the supposed “constitutional rights” explanation by the majority is 
without merit.  Fraud investigation is the legitimate bread and butter of state AG 
investigations.  The Supreme Court holds that the First Amendment does not protect such 
fraud.  In Illinois ex rel. Lisa Madigan, Attorney General of Illinois, v. Telemarketing 
Associates, Inc., 538 U.S. 600 (2003), the Illinois Attorney General sued professional 
charitable fundraisers for fraud.  It is noteworthy that this was a state AG investigation of 
fraud, just like in our matter.  It is also noteworthy that this was, as Supreme Court cases 
go, quite recent, and certainly one that is as solid a precedent today as the day it was 
handed down.   
 
 The Supreme Court cited a string of strong precedents to declare that “the First 
Amendment does not shield fraud.”  538 U.S. at 612.  As it quoted from prior cases, “the 
government’s power ‘to protect people against fraud’ has ‘always been recognized in this 
country and is firmly established.”  Id. “The ‘intentional lie’ is ‘no essential part of any 
exposition of ideas.’”  Id.  That case itself shows that not only does fraud lack First 
Amendment protection in general, it lacks First Amendment protection vis-à-vis state 
AGs in particular. 
   
 
II-B     House Rule X(3)(k) Makes Clear the Science Committee Has No  
Pertinent Authority 
  
Other committees recognize that they do not have authority to investigate State 
Attorneys General the way this committee seeks to.  Rep. Chaffetz, Chairman of the 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform recently commented to Wolf Blitzer 
on CNN that he would not be investigating the Florida Attorney General.  He said: “Well, 
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I don’t see the federal jurisdiction in this case.  It does look to me to be a state issue.  It is 
regarding an attorney general in Florida.  I just don’t see the federal jurisdiction.”    
 
 
Even if, arguendo, some committee were to march out and defend the asserted 
First Amendment rights of businesses to give false reports to their investors, it would not 
be this committee.  This Committee is not the one that proposes constitutional 
amendments; not the one that proposes civil rights bills; and, not the one that conducts 
oversight over parts of the government policing civil rights.           
 
This Committee’s legislative jurisdiction is set forth in House Rule X 1.(p) and 
special oversight functions in X 3.(k).   
 
The Supreme Court and the lower courts have long made clear that committee 
authority to enforce subpoenas, in constitutionally questionable subjects like today’s 
hearing, must be stated with special clarity, which we will see in a moment, is not stated 
with respect to the Science Committee and state AGs.  In United States v. Rumely, 345 
U.S. 41 (1953), the Court considered a contempt of a House Select Committee on 
Lobbying Activities.  Rumely was selling pamphlets described by the Court as “of a 
particular political tendentiousness,” and the Committee was looking into bulk purchases 
for distribution.  By ordinary language, bulk purchasing of political pamphlets could 
come under the Committee’s stated authority.  But, Justice Frankfurter, in his opinion for 
the Court, insisted on avoiding constitutional issues because the charter of the committee 
did not give it sharply clear authority over Rumely.  “Certainly it does not do violence to 
the phrase ‘lobbying activities’ to give it a more restricted scope.”  Id. at 48. 
 
This principle is particularly reinforced when dealing with state officials.  As 
previously stated, there are no instances of subpoena enforcement against state Attorneys 
General.  There is one case, which goes against what the Science Committee majority is 
trying to do, as to an interstate compact agency.  This interstate compact agency, the New 
York – New Jersey Port Authority, came into existence (as states themselves, of course, 
do not) by Congressional approval of the interstate compact. And, the head of the 
authority, Austin Tobin, was involved in the mundane matters of transportation, not the 
law enforcement activity of state AGs.   
 
 A House committee tried to enforce, by contempt, a subpoena for documents from 
Tobin.  The D.C. Circuit threw out a contempt conviction.  Tobin presented as a defense 
that the subpoena sought internal matters from the State.  The Court followed Rumely and 
found that the House Committee lacked the necessary sharply clear authority for its 
subpoena.  As it said about Tobin, “Appellant is no criminal and no one seriously 
considers him one.”  Tobin v. United States, 306 F.2d 270, 275 (D.C. Cir. 1962).  It 
would not enforce a subpoena because “To avoid such constitutional holdings is our duty, 
particularly in the area of the right of Congress to inform itself.  United States v. Rumely, 
345 U.S. 41 (1953).”  Id. at 274.   
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 What Rumely and Tobin say, about not giving broad reading to federal 
instruments as to their reaching into state matters, is good law today. As recently as 2014, 
the Supreme Court decided Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014).  It refuses to 
interpret the chemical weapons ban to apply to state-level crime, despite Justice 
Department advocacy of its doing so, for a conviction at the trial level affirmed at the 
circuit level.  The ban had to be interpreted narrowly, because “The Government’s 
reading of section 229 would alter sensitive federal-state relationships,’” and by “denying 
any one government complete jurisdiction over all the concerns of public life, federalism 
protects the liberty of the individual from arbitrary power.”  Id. at 2092.  
 
 No one has found any other case on Congressional investigations into state-level 
bodies, putting aside the interstate compact agency in Tobin (which discarded the House 
committee’s effort anyway).  That Tobin House Committee’s loss would be front and 
center at the Justice Department, and front and center in court, if the Science Committee 
tried to enforce its subpoena.  The House Committee could not evade nor escape the 
question: where is its clear authority to subpoena state AGs? 
 
 Viewed in this light, the Science Committee simply has no real authority to 
enforce subpoenas against state AGs.  Neither its legislative authority nor its oversight 
authority speak of state officials at all, let alone state AGs. Its legislative authority, in 
House Rule X.1(p) speaks of many agencies, like “federally owned or operated 
nonmilitary energy laboratories,” and specific agencies like NASA and NSF.  But, it does 
not speak of any state ones, let alone state AGs.  Nor does it speak of constitutional 
rights, nor of fraud. 
 
 Its oversight functions in X.3(k) says: “The Committee on Science, Space, and 
Technology shall review and study on a continuing basis laws, programs, and 
Government activities relating to nonmilitary research and development.”  (Underlining 
added.)  Throughout Rule X.3, the capitalized word “Government” is meant as Federal 
Government.  For example, it could hardly be imagined that Rule X.3(f) is referring to 
states when it says that “(f) The Committee on Foreign Affairs shall review and study on 
a continuing basis laws, programs, and Government activities relating to customs 
administration, intelligence activities relating to foreign policy, international financial 
and monetary organizations, and international fishing agreements.”  It is the federal 
“Government,” not the states, which handles customs, foreign intelligence, and 
international financial and monetary matters.    
  
A separate question is raised by the Committee subpoenas to organizations 
advocating strong environmental beliefs and positions.  In some respects, these 
environmental advocacy organizations are like civil rights groups during the civil rights 
movement.  Namely, in some parts of the country, like coal or oil producing regions with 
intense feelings on the subject, for example, for a member of the organization or other 
idealistic related person to have their name published and condemned might expose them 
to harassment or worse for simple advocacy.  It is a well-established judicial principle, 
going back to the era of the civil rights movement, that broad legislative subpoenas will 
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not be enforced that expose organizations of such vulnerable advocacy.   Gibson v. 
Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 372 U.S. 539, 558 (1963). 
 
  
In conclusion, the Science Committee cannot and should not try to enforce 
subpoenas against State Attorneys General looking into climate risk fraud. 
 
